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John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). On
Liberty. 1869. |
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| THE SUBJECT
of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so
unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of
Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the
nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately
exercised by society over the individual. A question seldom
stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which
profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age
by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself
recognised as the vital question of the future. It is so far
from being new, that, in a certain sense, it has divided
mankind, almost from the remotest ages; but in the stage of
progress into which the more civilized portions of the species
have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and
requires a different and more fundamental treatment. |
1 |
| The struggle between Liberty and
Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of
history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in
that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this
contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and
the Government. By liberty, was meant protection against the
tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived
(except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a
necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they
ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a governing tribe
or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or
conquest, who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure
of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture,
perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might
be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their power was
regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a
weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects,
no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker
members of the community from being preyed on by innumerable
vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of
prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down.
But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon
preying upon the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was
indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against
his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of patriots was to set
limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to
exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they
meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by
obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called
political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as
a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he
did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was
held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later
expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks, by
which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort,
supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary
condition to some of the more important acts of the governing
power. To the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling
power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or
less, to submit. It was not so with the second; and, to attain
this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it
more completely, became everywhere the principal object of the
lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were content to
combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on
condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously
against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations
beyond this point. |
2 |
| A time, however, came, in the progress of
human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of
nature that their governors should be an independent power,
opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much
better that the various magistrates of the State should be
their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In
that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security
that the powers of government would never be abused to their
disadvantage. By degrees this new demand for elective and
temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions
of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and
superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to
limit the power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for
making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of
the ruled, some persons began to think that too much
importance had been attached to the limitation of the power
itself. That (it might seem) was a resource against
rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the
people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be
identified with the people; that their interest and will
should be the interest and will of the nation. The nation did
not need to be protected against its own will. There was no
fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the rulers be
effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and
it could afford to trust them with power of which it could
itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the
nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for
exercise. This mode of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling,
was common among the last generation of European liberalism,
in the Continental section of which it still apparently
predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a government
may do, except in the case of such governments as they think
ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among
the political thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of
sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own
country, if the circumstances which for a time encouraged it,
had continued unaltered. |
3 |
| But, in political and philosophical
theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and
infirmities which failure might have concealed from
observation. The notion, that the people have no need to limit
their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when
popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of
as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither
was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary
aberrations as those of the French Revolution, the worst of
which were the work of an usurping few, and which, in any
case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular
institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against
monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a
democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the
earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most
powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and
responsible government became subject to the observations and
criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now
perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the
power of the people over themselves," do not express the true
state of the case. The "people" who exercise the power are not
always the same people with those over whom it is exercised;
and the "self-government" spoken of is not the government of
each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the
people, moreover, practically means the will of the most
numerous or the most active part of the people; the
majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted
as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire
to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much
needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The
limitation, therefore, of the power of government over
individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of
power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to
the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending
itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the
inclination of those important classes in European society to
whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had
no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political
speculations "the tyranny of the majority" is now generally
included among the evils against which society requires to be
on its guard. |
4 |
| Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the
majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread,
chiefly as operating through the acts of the public
authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when
society is itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the
separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannizing
are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of
its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its
own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of
right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought
not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable
than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not
usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer
means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details
of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore,
against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there
needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing
opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to
impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and
practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them;
to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the
formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways,
and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model
of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of
collective opinion with individual independence: and to find
that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as
indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as
protection against political despotism. |
5 |
| But though this proposition is not likely
to be contested in general terms, the practical question,
where to place the limit—how to make the fitting adjustment
between individual independence and social control—is a
subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. All
that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the
enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people.
Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in
the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not
fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should
be, is the principal question in human affairs; but if we
except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those
which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages,
and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the
decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the
people of any given age and country no more suspect any
difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind
had always been agreed. The rules which obtain among
themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying.
This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the
magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb
says, a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the
first. The effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving
respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one
another, is all the more complete because the subject is one
on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons
should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to
himself. People are accustomed to believe, and have been
encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character
of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this
nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons
unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to
their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the
feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be
required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes,
would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to
himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but
an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons,
can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons,
when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by
other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of
one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus
supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but
the only one he generally has for any of his notions of
morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written
in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the
interpretation even of that. Men's opinions, accordingly, on
what is laudable or blameable, are affected by all the
multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to
the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those
which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes
their reason—at other times their prejudices or superstitions:
often their social affections, not seldom their antisocial
ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or
contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires or fears
for themselves—their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest.
Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the
morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and
its feelings of class superiority. The morality between
Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between
princes and subjects, between nobles and roturiers, between
men and women, has been for the most part the creation of
these class interests and feelings: and the sentiments thus
generated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of the
members of the ascendant class, in their relations among
themselves. Where, on the other hand, a class, formerly
ascendant, has lost its ascendancy, or where its ascendancy is
unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the
impress of an impatient dislike of superiority. Another grand
determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and
forbearance, which have been enforced by law or opinion, has
been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences
or aversions of their temporal masters, or of their gods. This
servility, though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it
gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; it
made men burn magicians and heretics. Among so many baser
influences, the general and obvious interests of society have
of course had a share, and a large one, in the direction of
the moral sentiments: less, however, as a matter of reason,
and on their own account, than as a consequence of the
sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them: and
sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do
with the interests of society, have made themselves felt in
the establishment of moralities with quite as great force. |
6 |
| The likings and dislikings of society, or
of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which
has practically determined the rules laid down for general
observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. And in
general, those who have been in advance of society in thought
and feeling, have left this condition of things unassailed in
principle, however they may have come into conflict with it in
some of its details. They have occupied themselves rather in
inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than
in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a
law to individuals. They preferred endeavouring to alter the
feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they
were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in
defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The only case in
which the higher ground has been taken on principle and
maintained with consistency, by any but an individual here and
there, is that of religious belief: a case instructive in many
ways, and not least so as forming a most striking instance of
the fallibility of what is called the moral sense: for the
odium theologicum, in a sincere bigot, is one of the most
unequivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who first broke the
yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were in
general as little willing to permit difference of religious
opinion as that church itself. But when the heat of the
conflict was over, without giving a complete victory to any
party, and each church or sect was reduced to limit its hopes
to retaining possession of the ground it already occupied;
minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming
majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom
they could not convert, for permission to differ. It is
accordingly on this battle field, almost solely, that the
rights of the individual against society have been asserted on
broad grounds of principle, and the claim of society to
exercise authority over dissentients, openly controverted. The
great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it
possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an
indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being
is accountable to others for his religious belief. Yet so
natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care
about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been
practically realized, except where religious indifference,
which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological
quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of
almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant
countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit
reserves. One person will bear with dissent in matters of
church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerate
everybody, short of a Papist or an Unitarian; another, every
one who believes in revealed religion; a few extend their
charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a God and
in a future state. Wherever the sentiment of the majority is
still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little
of its claim to be obeyed. |
7 |
| In England, from the peculiar
circumstances of our political history, though the yoke of
opinion is perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter, than in
most other countries of Europe; and there is considerable
jealousy of direct interference, by the legislative or the
executive power, with private conduct; not so much from any
just regard for the independence of the individual, as from
the still subsisting habit of looking on the government as
representing an opposite interest to the public. The majority
have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their
power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do so,
individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to
invasion from the government, as it already is from public
opinion. But, as yet, there is a considerable amount of
feeling ready to be called forth against any attempt of the
law to control individuals in things in which they have not
hitherto been accustomed to be controlled by it; and this with
very little discrimination as to whether the matter is, or is
not, within the legitimate sphere of legal control; insomuch
that the feeling, highly salutary on the whole, is perhaps
quite as often misplaced as well grounded in the particular
instances of its application. There is, in fact, no recognised
principle by which the propriety or impropriety of government
interference is customarily tested. People decide according to
their personal preferences. Some, whenever they see any good
to be done, or evil to be remedied, would willingly instigate
the government to undertake the business; while others prefer
to bear almost any amount of social evil, rather than add one
to the departments of human interests amenable to governmental
control. And men range themselves on one or the other side in
any particular case, according to this general direction of
their sentiments; or according to the degree of interest which
they feel in the particular thing which it is proposed that
the government should do, or according to the belief they
entertain that the government would, or would not, do it in
the manner they prefer; but very rarely on account of any
opinion to which they consistently adhere, as to what things
are fit to be done by a government. And it seems to me that in
consequence of this absence of rule or principle, one side is
at present as often wrong as the other; the interference of
government is, with about equal frequency, improperly invoked
and improperly condemned. |
8 |
| The object of this Essay is to assert one
very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the
dealings of society with the individual in the way of
compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical
force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of
public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so
would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading
him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must
be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part
of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign. |
9 |
| It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say
that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in
the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of
children, or of young persons below the age which the law may
fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a
state to require being taken care of by others, must be
protected against their own actions as well as against
external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of
consideration those backward states of society in which the
race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early
difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great,
that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them;
and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in
the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps
otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of
government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be
their improvement, and the means justified by actually
effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no
application to any state of things anterior to the time when
mankind have become capable of being improved by free and
equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but
implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are
so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have
attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement
by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in
all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves),
compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and
penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a
means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security
of others. |
10 |
| It is proper to state that I forego any
advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea
of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard
utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but
it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the
permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those
interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual
spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those
actions of each, which concern the interest of other people.
If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a primâ
facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal
penalties are not safely applicable, by general
disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the
benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to
perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to
bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other
joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which
he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of
individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's
life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against
ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty
to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for
not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his
actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly
accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is
true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion
than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to
others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing
evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there are
many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that
exception. In all things which regard the external relations
of the individual, he is de jure amenable to those
whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as
their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding
him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from
the special expediencies of the case: either because it is a
kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better,
when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any
way in which society have it in their power to control him; or
because the attempt to exercise control would produce other
evils, greater than those which it would prevent. When such
reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility,
the conscience of the agent himself should step into the
vacant judgment seat, and protect those interests of others
which have no external protection; judging himself all the
more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being
made accountable to the judgment of his fellow-creatures. |
11 |
| But there is a sphere of action in which
society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any,
only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a
person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it
also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and
undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself,
I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever
affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the
objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will
receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the
appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the
inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of
conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of
thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment
on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral,
or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing
opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since
it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which
concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance
as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on
the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and
pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own
character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences
as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures,
so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they
should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly,
from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty,
within the same limits, of combination among individuals;
freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to
others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full
age, and not forced or deceived. |
12 |
| No society in which these liberties are
not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its
form of government; and none is completely free in which they
do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which
deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own
way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs,
or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper
guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and
spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other
to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each
to live as seems good to the rest. |
13 |
| Though this doctrine is anything but new,
and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is
no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general
tendency of existing opinion and practice. Society has
expended fully as much effort in the attempt (according to its
lights) to compel people to conform to its notions of
personal, as of social excellence. The ancient commonwealths
thought themselves entitled to practise, and the ancient
philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every part of
private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the
State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental
discipline of every one of its citizens; a mode of thinking
which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded
by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by
foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a
short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so
easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the
salutary permanent effects of freedom. In the modern world,
the greater size of political communities, and above all, the
separation between spiritual and temporal authority (which
placed the direction of men's consciences in other hands than
those which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so
great an interference by law in the details of private life;
but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more
strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in
self-regarding, than even in social matters; religion, the
most powerful of the elements which have entered into the
formation of moral feeling, having almost always been governed
either by the ambition of a hierarchy, seeking control over
every department of human conduct, or by the spirit of
Puritanism. And some of those modern reformers who have placed
themselves in strongest opposition to the religions of the
past, have been noway behind either churches or sects in their
assertion of the right of spiritual domination: M. Comte, in
particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his Systeme
de Politique Positive, aims at establishing (though by
moral more than by legal appliances) a despotism of society
over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the
political ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the
ancient philosophers. |
14 |
| Apart from the peculiar tenets of
individual thinkers, there is also in the world at large an
increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society
over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by
that of legislation: and as the tendency of all the changes
taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and
diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not
one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but,
on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable. The
disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as
fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations
as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported
by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident
to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint
by anything but want of power; and as the power is not
declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral
conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect,
in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase. |
15 |
| It will be convenient for the argument,
if, instead of at once entering upon the general thesis, we
confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of
it, on which the principle here stated is, if not fully, yet
to a certain point, recognised by the current opinions. This
one branch is the Liberty of Thought: from which it is
impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of
writing. Although these liberties, to some considerable
amount, form part of the political morality of all countries
which profess religious toleration and free institutions, the
grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they rest,
are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so
thoroughly appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion,
as might have been expected. Those grounds, when rightly
understood, are of much wider application than to only one
division of the subject, and a thorough consideration of this
part of the question will be found the best introduction to
the remainder. Those to whom nothing which I am about to say
will be new, may therefore, I hope, excuse me, if on a subject
which for now three centuries has been so often discussed, I
venture on one discussion more. |
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