By Crown Prince Alexander of Yugoslavia International Herald Tribune

LONDON - Almost regardless of what may be decided this weekend at the peace
conference on Kosovo, there will be no lasting peace or democracy in
southeastern Europe until the NATO allies have a fundamental policy for the
entire region. Bombing, which the allies are threatening, may actually
reinforce each side's positions in the Kosovo conflict. Moreover,
establishing peace and democracy in only one area such as Kosovo - as
Western countries are currently planning - will only be of very limited
value.

The Balkans have never been amenable to easy solutions imposed from outside.
Even at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union gradually lost control
over Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania, while the West barely contained the
perennial Greek-Turkish disputes, despite the fact that both countries were
NATO members and therefore, at least formally, allies.

Compared to the Cold War period, the current condition of the Balkans is
quite favorable. Although the Yugoslav war has played havoc with the
economies of the area and the Balkans' aspiration to project an image of
stability, the region is now at the top of the European agenda. Not only has
NATO mounted in Yugoslavia the biggest military operation in its existence,
but also many international organizations are now deeply engaged in the
area. The European Union is financing infrastructure projects designed to
connect Romania and Bulgaria to main transport routes, Turkey is paraded as
one of Europe's key strategic allies and the United States is mediating in
the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus and the islands of the Aegean Sea.

More significantly, the promise of full integration into both NATO and the
EU has been extended to the region's states in return for their good
behavior.

At the beginning of this century, the great powers regarded the Balkans as
partly a geographic region and partly a disease for which effective
quarantine measures were the only adequate cure.

The Balkans may yet end the century in the same situation. The story is not
one of mischief or cynicism (although there was plenty of both) but of a
lack of vision, which could lead to missed historic opportunities and
continued misery for the region's people.

The Dayton peace accords that put a halt to the Bosnian war in November 1995
were based on a set of dubious assumptions. The first was the belief that,
in order to reunite the Bosnian state, one must start by separating the
various fighting armies. Coupled with that was the belief that ''the
people'' are ''good'' and desire peace and that only their leaders could be
''nasty.''

Once the people were allowed the opportunity to vote freely, the thinking
goes, the warlords would be removed from power and all Bosnians would live
together again. The Dayton accords provided for elections. In addition,
there was the assumption that there was no crisis that a well-written
constitution could not solve.

Dayton included a fine constitutional specimen, complete with rotating
presidencies, constitutional courts and arbitral tribunals. But, finally,
there was the belief that talking tough to the ''natives'' and threatening
unspecified retribution without actually having to commit to any action
should be sufficient to bring about peace.

At every step, the troops that were dispatched to Bosnia carefully eschewed
any military involvement while the Western governments increased their
rhetoric.
The violence in Bosnia has stopped, and we should all be grateful for that.
Nevertheless, Bosnia remains divided, and cut away from its natural economic
partners in the region. But, in many respects, Bosnia is yesterday's story,
for the West's real challenge is now with the entire region.

Yugoslavia represents the classic example of what can go wrong in the
transition from a communist society. The war, for which President Slobodan
Milosevic bears heavy responsibility, perpetuated a disguised communist rule
and postponed decisions about the nature of the state. Mr. Milosevic fought
the war in the name of Serbian unity and ethnic purity. Yet Serbs are still
divided and Serbia still contains the highest number of ethnic minorities
among all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. Having been the most
integrated Eastern European state before 1989, Yugoslavia is now a pariah in
Europe.

To complete this cycle of tragedies, the Yugoslavia that Mr. Milosevic
invented after 1991 remains a rickety affair. Montenegro, Serbia's partner
in the federation, looks increasingly unreliable. Moreover, the institutions
of the state are an even greater farce than they were during Tito's
dictatorship.

For a number of years after the demise of old Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav
federal presidency, which was meant to represent both Montenegro and Serbia,
remained a mere cipher designed to obscure Mr. Milosevic's political
control. Serbia and - to a lesser extent - Montenegro have therefore ended
with the worst possible outcome: They are the only former Yugoslav republics
not to have a new identity.

Mr. Milosevic has failed in his nationalist dreams, but succeeded in
destroying his country's civic society. Ten years ago, the people of
Yugoslavia were in the forefront of all communist states. Today, Yugoslavia
is at the bottom of the pile, with no salvation in sight. In addition, there
is more to come, for the crucial issue of Kosovo has yet to be addressed.

Up until now, the United States and the European Union have solely relied on
negotiations, exclusively with the existing regimes, often in the hope of
achieving brief periods of illusory peace. The leaders of the region, in
turn, have portrayed themselves as saviors.
The tactic has clearly not worked. Far from being upholders of any solution,
the autocratic leaders in some of the countries that call themselves
Yugoslavia's ''successors'' are actually part of the problem.

But a serious Western plan of stabilizing the region is still feasible. It
should start with establishing democratic roots in the capitals of
southeastern Europe. Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb and Tirana would be the
targets for the creation of fundamental democratic institutions, which would
uphold human rights and freedom of the media and implement an economic
revival plan.

Calculated pressure would be imposed upon the current regimes to push them
out of power. The region's dictators should be attacked where they hurt
most: by taking measures to recover the billions of state assets that they
have managed to spirit away from their countries.

And, ultimately, the prospect of genuine European integration, as well as
economic reconstruction, should be promised to those countries that mange to
emerge from their current political rut. Of course, it may be argued that
such an approach will take years to bear fruit and cost a great deal. But
billions of dollars have already been spent in peacekeeping operations, and
the proposal is to spend much more in Kosovo now. For the moment, there is
neither peace nor stability. It is time to go back to the fundamentals,
however long it takes.

The writer, heir to the throne of Yugoslavia, lives in London. He
contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.