The Kosovo peace conference concluded this week with claims of a limited success. Some progress is evident. The deal reached represents nothing more than agreement over principles, and in the Balkans details matter more than bits of paper. Europe and the US merely gained time, while the region is still hovering on the precipice of a disaster. 

The peace conference was a finely balanced exercise of reconciling the impossible. It sought to promise the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo enough freedom in order to persuade them to stop fighting, while reassuring the Serbs that the province would remain part of Yugoslavia. None of the sides fighting in the Balkans ever believed in the autonomy plans which France and Britain - the two chairpersons of the conference - put forward. The people of the Balkans always knew that autonomies are merely a prelude to independence, and that Kosovo was unlikely to be an exception. The Albanians and Serbs were compelled to come to the negotiating table under the intense pressure of the international community. In addition, they negotiated not in order to get a deal, but more in order to find out just what the international community was prepared to tolerate. The Albanians demanded a referendum at the end of the three years of autonomy which they were offered as part of the peace deal, knowing fully well that this is a nicer way of saying that independence is their ultimate fate. And President Milosevic of Yugoslavia - that veteran of so many previous unobserved agreements - was prepared to sign any document that the deal envisaged - in order to remain in power, provided it was not monitored by Western forces, and that he could not be held accountable for what followed.

In order to avoid such dangers, Western negotiators demanded from the start that there should be a link between the political and the military agreements. After almost three weeks of intense negotiations, the outcome was still a separation between the political part of the peace - autonomy and elections in Kosovo - and the military side of the deal which should have provided for the stationing of Western forces.

The French, British and Americans can claim, with limited justification, that what was achieved is substantial. Milosevic’s regime was forced to admit that killing and ethically cleansing its own citizens is not its own internal affair. The Albanians were granted the autonomy that they had a decade ago, at least on paper. In addition, a cease-fire is to be maintained. Furthermore, both sides are committed to starting another conference in mid-March, in order to discuss the issue of military implementation. So far so good, but hardly the end of the story.

The Serbs and Albanians have promised to "consult" their own “people” about the deal in the next two weeks. All that the conference has achieved is an exchange of letters, in which both sides claim to have accepted the main provisions of a peace. It is easy to see what will follow. The Yugoslav parliament, which is a “café” populated by President Milosevic's grace and favour individuals, will demand on “command” amendments. So will the more extreme elements in the Kosovo Liberation Army. When the two delegations return to France in mid-March, therefore, they will have more to discuss than just the question of the introduction of Western troops into the region. Even if violence is avoided in the near future, the preparations for future war will continue. The Albanians, who are expected to disarm their guerrilla movement as part of a peace agreement, will hide many of their existing weapons. And the Yugoslav regime, required to withdraw its military and police from the region, will arm the local Serb population, the precedence being Croatia and Bosnia. The calm on the surface will hide games that are more sinister. Moreover, Western governments will have to use this short breathing space in order to gain lost ground.

The important question now is whether Western governments will find it possible to persuade Russia (with carrots) to accept that NATO be allowed to station troops on the territory of Yugoslavia, in Kosovo. The hope in Western capitals is that, if this is achieved, Russia will force the Belgrade regime to accept the deal and a modicum of peace in the region could be assured. Some compromises are possible: although Russia is unlikely to allow the West complete room for manoeuvre and is clearly unhappy about a purely NATO force in the region, the Kremlin has few other options. A deal may be struck whereby Western troops will serve under a NATO command, but other troops including the Russians will also be on the ground, under a wider international mandate. It is even possible to envisage that Milosevic may command his curious coalition of communists and nationalists in Belgrade to ultimately accept the stationing of these forces. So, does it mean peace in our times? Hardly.

At every stage of the Yugoslav war, which has lasted for almost a decade now, the West dealt with the immediate crisis, but refused to look at the region as a whole. First it was Slovenia, and nobody dealt with Croatia. Then it was Croatia's turn, while the violence started in Bosnia. And, while every Western government was preoccupied with Bosnia, President Milosevic in Belgrade eliminated the last vestiges of democratic hope, and dialogue with its own ethnic Albanian people, virtually guaranteeing the current disaster. Milosevic, together with the other dictators and regimes who have risen from the ashes of Yugoslavia by playing on nationalist and religious feelings, and economic frustration, are part of the problem, not a stepping stone to a solution. Any deal concluded with them, without creating a system of security for the entire region, is bound to fail.

Alternatives do exist, the encouragement of a serious democratic opposition in Belgrade, coupled with the isolation of the more extreme terrorist movements in Kosovo. The people of Yugoslavia must be offered carrots, rather than just sticks. They must be persuaded that, if they manage to shake off Milosevic’s rule, they will be reintegrated into the family of European nations, and aspire to be members of all global  institutions. Meanwhile, economic links must be established between the former Yugoslav states, everyone will benefit from the restoration of the internal market that the country represented. In addition, equal attention must be paid to the other dictators now operating in the region, from the rulers of Croatia to the various self-appointed ethnic Albanian leaders in Kosovo. True, the process of democratisation will be long and expensive, but it will guarantee a decent future for the long-suffering people. It is preferable to the current policy, which convenes international conferences like clockwork, commits Western forces for one operation after another, only to be faced with yet more wars, bloodshed, immigration and never ending seclusion.