A Success Story
Full of Pressure from Below and Reform from Above
(Spain 1990)
Department of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Information Office
The Francoist dictatorship left a legacy of centralised authoritarian
juridical and political regime in which power rested, in the first instance
with the State, and the head of State, the king, who used these legal but
extraordinary powers to return them to the people that were demanding them.
From the point of view of the monarchic institution, it could be said that
the King exchanged power for legitimacy, acquiring an unquestionable influence
and prestige. He nationalised an institution that in 1975 had provoked
a whole range of reactions including suspicion and rejection, and gave
the country a stability which was founded on a respected and neutral monarchist
institution.
HM King Juan Carlos of Spain and
HRH Crown Prince Aleksandar
II
The legal system that Franco left behind attributed to the Head of State
the power to choose the Head of the Government from among three names proposed
by the council of the realm. Some politicians, having the confidence of
the new King (such as Fernandez Miranda), succeeded in having Adolfo Suarez
put on the list, and he was designated.
Suarez orchestrated the legal change by using the Francoist parliament
itself, by means of a Law of Political Reform, which called for the direct
election of the representatives by universal suffrage. The Cortes approved
its own demise and that of the system hardly a year after the death of
its author. The most recalcitrant Francoists had their hands tied, because
the King, the Government, both national and international opinion and even
some of their own comrades were in favour of the operation. The process
was carried out by means of the completion of different stages in the Government's
transition to democracy. In contact, and at times in conflict with, the
democratic opposition, that was trying to guide this evolution towards
its logical conclusion and to prevent it from becoming a mere system of
limited democracy.
On 15 December 1976, the reform was approved by referendum in which
77% of the total electorate participated. Practically the entire opposition
was tolerated by the government in power and shortly afterward it was legalised,
with the exception of the Communist Party. This last was legalised in April
1977, which resulted in the resignation of the Minister of the Navy and
the formal protest of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.
On 15 June 1977, the first general elections were held by universal
suffrage in which approximately 80% of the electorate participated. The
Central Democratic Union (UCD) obtained a simple majority and formed a
government, directing its efforts to reach a basic agreement that would
permit the drawing up of a new constitutional charter approved by referendum
in December of the following year, and that would also create an economic
policy, by consensus, that would alleviate the untenable economic situation
characterised by among other things, inflation of over 25%.
Democracy's Final Test and Its Definitive Consolidation
(Spain 1990)
Department of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Information Office
The weakness of the new democratic government, the political infighting
in UCD and the difficulties created by the economical crisis conformed
the alibi used by a group of Old Regime nostalgics to attempt a coup d'Etat.
On 23 February 1981, during the debate preceding Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo's
investiture as successor to Adolfo Suarez who had just resigned on the
insistence of his own party members a small grupo of Guardia Civil occupied
the Congress of Deputies at the same time that Captain General of Valencia
declared a state of emergency and ordered the militarisation of the region.
The decisive action of the King aborted the attempted coup.
After the failed coup, both public opinion and the political parties
together expressed their rejection of violence and desire for consensus.
The day after the attempt, massive, orderly demonstrations were held in
the streets of all Spain's major cities. The paradox lay in the fact that
the attempt of a few military officials to destroy democracy resulted in
its reinforcement and the recognition of the Monarchy as an institution
indissolubly tied to Spanish democracy.
The victory of the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol at the polls in
October 1982 practically completed the cycle of democratic consolidation
in that new regime had successfully passed a the supreme test of peaceful
transfer of power. Spain's accession to the European Community on 1 January,
1986 consummated Spain's reintegration in the Europe to which it has always
belonged and completed a singular process of democratic normalisation.
The "Agony" of the Regime and the Impossibility of Francoism
Without Franco
(Spain 1990)
Department of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Information Office
During the 1970's, many Francoists were convinced of the impossibility
of perpetuating the system and creating a "Francoism without Franco". The
scant ideological formulations from the post war period had been forgotten,
the fear that has so terrorised society had gradually dissipated with the
accumulation of freedom and repression had been reduced. The Church, the
former pillar of the regime which had provided it with political figures,
a veneer of legitimacy and an efficient propaganda apparatus over the years,
had changed profoundly along Spanish society and as a consequence of the
Second Vatican Council, the effects of which were devastating for the dictatorship.
In 1971, the Spanish Catholic Church publicly apologised for its partisan
attitude during the Civil War and thus shattered one of the few pillars
on which the precarious Francoist ideology still rested.
Without ideological support, the dictatorship began to lose the war
of ideas to the opposition. Intellectuals, union leaders, students and
journalist succeeded in convincing the country that Europe meant democracy.
To the Spaniards, deprived of any alternative identity, being accepted
by their neighbours came to be a question of self-esteem and this became
a dilemma the Franco regime could never overcome. Its own adherents were
also convinced of the need fore change.
Adding to the fervour of the gap separating the regime and sectors of
Spanish society that growing wider by day, the political opposition began
to organise. On the left were: an active Communist Party (PCE), very influential
in intellectual and working class circles and an extensive opposition union
organisation, Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) of Communist persuasion, which
had also infiltrated Francoist trade unionism: other minor syndical forces
of Socialist inspiration such as the historic Union General de Trabajadores
(UGT), linked to the equally historic Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol
(PSOE), and the Union Sindical Obrea (USO), tied to other incipient forces.
The clandestine unions had organised considerable economic strikes in 1956
and 1962, but had never instigated the general political strike preached
by the Partido Communista de Espana since 1965 as the means to unseat the
regime.
Since 1964, anti-Franco groups had controlled in the student organisations
and succeeded in irritating the regime without actually being able to seriously
threaten it. Even separatist Basque terrorism in form of ETA had been unable
to do so, until it assassinated Carrero Blanco, the President of the Government
in 1973. ETA at first had been made up ultra nationalist Catholic youths,
thus lacking a wide social base, which it only won thanks to the repression
perpetrated by the dictatorship which declared states of exception in the
region, a further frustration to the Basque population which had been stripped
of its rights and culture since the end of the Civil War.
Carrero Blanco's death was an event of political consequence since he
had been the figure with the most authority after Franco and the only person
capable of uniting the diverse Francoist families, as well as the only
man able, as a military man himself, to command the respect of the Armed
Forces. Carrero was, in effect considered to be most authoritative representative
of the constitutional artifice constructed by the dictatorship.
The Transition From Dictatorship to Democracy
(Spain 1990)
Department of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Information Office
Its constitutional artifice was founded on a law by which Juan Carlos,
as King, would be named as the Head of State's successor. The prince was
a direct descendent of legitimate Bourbon dynasty, the grandson of Alfonso
XIII, he was the oldest son of the Count of Barcelona Don Juan, Don Juan
was the head of the Royal Household, the son of Queen Victoria Eugenia
of Battemberg and served in the British Navy, he was also a convinced democrat
and Franco's rival in the 1940's and he maintained frequent disputes with
the dictator throughout the course of the regime. In 1948, he sent Juan
Carlos to be educated in Spain and surrounded him with monarchists. In
such difficult circumstances, the Prince was able to remain aloof and avoid
compromising situations. When Franco died 20 November 1975, Juan Carlos
was unknown to the greater part of the Spanish population including much
of the opposition and numerous Francoist politicians.
The death by natural causes of General Franco occurred in atmosphere
of political tense, happening as it did one year after a record number
strikes were held in Spain. In the first eight months of 1975, Basque separatist
terrorism in the form of ETA was especially active. The democratic opposition
organised itself and deployed ever wider protest demonstrations demanding
an institutional break with the dictatorship.
The atmosphere in the street, in the media, in the lecture halls, favoured
change and even the most avid Francoist sectors were not impervious to
the general climate. In fact, it was a team of politicians of Francoist
and conservative roots which smoothed the way for the transition to democratic
institutions. This team had been chosen by the new Head of State himself,
a decision which determined the course of the transition.
The King lent the new regime a double legitimacy in that, to the various
forces the regime, he represented the "legal" succession to Franco and
that, in secular terms he was also the legitimate heir to the dynasty.
It was true that the Monarchy was not a popular institution in Spain, but
it also holds that it represented historical continuity for large conservative
sectors of the population. It was, moreover, the only alternative for the
Armed Forces whose Chief of Staff was in fact the King. The Crown was able,
then, to seek out support from the remaining sectors of Spanish society,
up to then set apart from and excluded from the political sphere. Furthermore,
it needed the support and recognition of those sectors of the democratic
opposition to acquire democratic legitimacy, which up to that point it
lacked, and to transform itself into the "Monarchy of all Spaniards".
In contrast to that which had occurred in other countries, where the
establishment of democracy came at the hands of the Allied forces or by
military action. In Spain political freedom was recovered through the combined
movement of a group coming up "from below" and by the initiative from "above"
thus giving it a legal character known in the strict sense as the "transition".
HM King Juan Carlos of Spain and
HRH Crown Prince Aleksandar
II
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